A general issue in computational optimization is to develop combinatorial algorithms for semidefinite programming. We address this issue when the base field is nonarchimedean. We provide a solution for a class of semidefinite feasibility problems given by generic matrices with a Metzler-type sign pattern. Our approach is based on tropical geometry. We define tropical spectrahedra as the images by the valuation of nonarchimedean spectrahedra, and provide an explicit description of the tropical spectrahedra arising from the aforementioned class of problems. We deduce that the tropical semidefinite feasibility problems obtained in this way are equivalent to stochastic mean payoff games, which have been well studied in algorithmic game theory. This allows us to solve nonarchimedean semidefinite feasibility problems using algorithms for stochastic games. These algorithms are of a combinatorial nature and work for large instances.
INTRODUCTION
Semidefinite programming consists in optimizing a linear function over a spectrahedron. The latter is a subset of R n defined by linear matrix inequalities, i.e., a set of the form S = {x ∈ R n : Q (0) + x1Q (1) 
where the Q (k) are symmetric matrices of order m, and denotes the Loewner order on the space of symmetric matrices. By definition, X Y if and only if X − Y is positive semidefinite.
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Semidefinite programs are usually solved via interior point methods. The latter provide an approximate solution in a polynomial number of iterations, provided that a strictly feasible initial solution, i.e., a point belonging to the interior of the set S, is known. We refer the reader to [9] for a detailed analysis of the complexity in the bit model of interior point methods for semidefinite programming, and for a discussion of earlier complexity results based on the ellipsoid method.
Semidefinite programming becomes a much harder matter if one requires an exact solution. The feasibility problem (deciding the emptiness of the set S) belongs to NP R ∩ coNP R , where the subscript R refers to the BSS model of computation [22] . It is not known to be in NP in the bit model. A difficulty here is that all feasible points may have entries of absolute value doubly exponential in the size of the input. Also, there may be no rational solution [23] . Beyond their theoretical interest, exact semidefinite algorithms may be useful to address problems of formal proofs, which sometimes lead to challenging (degenerate) instances [20] . Known exact methods rely either on general purpose semialgebraic techniques (like cylindrical decomposition) or on dedicated methods based on the computation of critical points, see the recent work [15] and the references therein.
Semidefinite programing is meaningful in any real closed field, and in particular in nonarchimedean (real closed) fields like the field of Puiseux series with real coefficients. Nonarchimedean semidefinite programming arises when considering parametric semidefinite programming problems over the reals, or structured problems in which the entries of the matrices have different orders of magnitudes. They are also of an intrinsic interest, since, by analogy with linear programming [19] , shifting to the nonarchimedean case is expected to shed light on the complexity of the classical problem over the reals. We note that the fields of Puiseux series are representative of the general nonarchimedean situation, since any nonarchimedean ordered field can be embedded in a field of generalized (Hahn) series [24, Th. 5.2.20 ].
Description of Main Results
In this paper, we address semidefinite programming in the nonarchimedean case, to which methods from tropical geometry can be applied. These methods are expected to allow one, in generic situations, to reduce semialgebraic problems to combinatorial problems, involving only the nonarchimedean valuations (leading exponents) of the coefficients of the input. We exploit the tropical approach by considering trop-ical spectrahedra, defined as the images by the valuation of nonarchimedean spectrahedra.
We first give a combinatorial description (Theorems 3.3 and 3.5) of tropical spectrahedra arising as the images of generic nonarchimedean spectrahedra determined by symmetric matrices that satisfy a Metzler-type sign condition (nonpositivity of off-diagonal entries). The subclass of inputs under consideration already covers known hard examples of semidefinite feasibility problems, involving for instance cascades of quadratic inequalities, as in [22] . The genericity assumption involves valuations. Assumptions of this nature are familiar in tropical geometry.
Then, we show (Corollaries 4.5 and 4.6) that the tropical semidefinite feasibility problem for the aforementioned class is equivalent to solving stochastic mean payoff games. The latter are a well-studied class of combinatorial zero-sum games with perfect information. The complexity of these games is a long-standing open problem. They belong to the class NP ∩ coNP, but they are not known to be polynomial.
This allows us to apply stochastic game algorithms to solve nonarchimedean semidefinite feasibility problems (Section 4.3). We obtain in this way both theoretical bounds and a practicable method solving some large scale instances.
The proofs of most statements can be found in the extended version of the present paper available as [4] .
Related Work
It is a general principle in tropical geometry that some information on the solutions of polynomial systems can be obtained by combinatorial reasoning about valuations. Early incarnations of this idea are the patchworking method of Viro to construct real curves with a prescribed topology [26] and its extension by Sturmfels [25] to complete intersections of hypersurfaces. See also the more recent work by Bihan [6] . Our characterization of tropical spectrahedra is obtained by applying the same kind of ideas to a class of semialgebraic systems which arise from semidefinite feasibility problems.
Yu [27] showed that the image by the valuation of the cone of nonarchimedean positive semidefinite matrices is described only by tropical minors of order 2. Our characterization of tropical Metzler spectrahedra can be thought of as an extension of her theorem to the case of spectrahedra.
This work also originates from the equivalence between tropical polyhedral feasibility problems and deterministic zero-sum games with mean payoff, established by Akian, Gaubert, and Guterman [2] . The novelty here is the handling of nonlinear semialgebraic convex problems, and the proof that the well-known class of stochastic mean payoff games correspond precisely to semidefinite feasibility problems with a Metzler structure, therefore relating two classes of problems which both have an unsettled complexity.
Finally, as mentioned above, the computation of exact solutions of semidefinite programming problems is of current interest. In particular, Nie, Ranestad, and Sturmfels [21] provided complexity measures based on the notion of algebraic degree, and dedicated algorithms have been developed by Henrion, Naldi, and Safey El Din [15] .
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND ILLUSTRATION OF OUR APPROACH
The nonarchimedean structure which we use in this paper is the field K of (formal generalized real) Puiseux series, which is composed of formal series of the form
where t is a formal parameter, (λi) i 1 is a strictly decreasing sequence of real numbers that is either finite or unbounded, and c λ i ∈ R \ {0} for all λi. There is also a special, empty series, which is denoted by 0. We denote by lc(x) the coefficient c λ 1 of the leading term in the series x, with the convention that lc(0) = 0. The addition and multiplication in K are defined in a natural way. Moreover, K can be endowed with a linear order , which is defined as x y if lc(x − y) 0. We denote K 0 the set of nonnegative series x, i.e., satisfying x 0. The valuation of an element x ∈ K as in (1) is defined as the greatest exponent λ1 occurring in the series. It is known that K is a real closed field (see [18] for instance).
In this paper, we consider a homogeneous variant of the semidefinite feasibility problem over the field K. More precisely, given symmetric matrices Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) ∈ K m×m , the problem which we study consists in determining whether or not the following spectrahedral cone
is trivial, meaning that it is reduced to the identically null point of K n 0 . The linear map x → x1Q1 + · · · + xnQn is a matrix pencil, which we denote by Q(x) for more brevity. The latter decision problem is in fact equivalent to the nontriviality problem of general spectrahedral cones in which the nonnegativity condition x ∈ K n 0 is relaxed. Indeed, given a pencil Q(x) of symmetric matrices, the spectrahedron {x ∈ K n : Q(x) 0} is trivial if and only if the spectrahedron {(y, z) ∈ K 2n 0 : (y1 − z1)Q1 + · · · + (yn − zn)Qn 0} is trivial. Even if the instances arising in this way are unlikely to be generic in the sense we define later in Section 3, we consider that the decision problem which we focus on already retains much of the complexity of the semidefinite feasibility problem over the field of Puiseux series.
Our approach applies to the case where the off-diagonal entries of the matrices Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) are nonpositive. Then, we associate to these matrices the following zero-sum game. There are two players, Player Min and Player Max, who control disjoint sets of states. The states of Player Min can be identified to the variables x1, . . . , xn. The states of Player Max can be identified to the row (or column) indices of the matrices, i.e., to the elements of {1, . . . , m}. In state x k , Player Min choses a subset {i, j} ⊂ {1, . . . , m} such that the entry Q ij . Then, Nature selects one element among i or j at random, with uniform probabilities (i.e., i or j is drawn with probability 1/2). 1 If i is drawn, meaning that the current state is now i, Player Max chooses a variable x l such that Q (l)
ii has a positive sign. He receives the valuation of Q (l)
ii from Player Min, and the next state becomes x l . If j is drawn, the rule of move and the payment are identical, up to the replacement of i by j. A (stationary) policy of one player is a map which associates to a state of the player an admissible move. We are interested in infinite plays, with an infinite number of turns. Player Max looks for a policy which maximizes the mean payment received from Player Min per time unit, while Player Min looks for a policy which minimizes it.
We can think informally of this construction as follows: Player Min wishes to show that the semidefinite programming problem is infeasible, whereas Player Max wishes to show that it is feasible.
Let us now illustrate our approach on an example in dimension 3. We consider the following pencil of symmetric matrices
and we aim at checking whether or not the spectrahedron {x ∈ K 3 0 : Q(x) 0} is trivial. The associated game is depicted on Figure 1 . The states of Player Min are depicted by circles. The states of Player Max are depicted by squares. The states in which Nature plays are depicted by full dots. The admissible moves of the game are represented by the edges between the states. The corresponding payments received by Player Max are indicated on these edges.
Observe that both players in this game have only two policies: at state 2 Player Max can move to 1 or to 3 , whereas at state 3 Player Min can choose the move 1 , 3 or the move 2 , 3 .
Suppose that Player Max chooses the policy which goes to state 1 from state 2 . If Player Min plays using the move 1 , 3 at state 3 , then a standard computation on Markov chain shows that the long-term average payoff of Player Max is equal to 3/40. Similarly, if Player Min chooses the move 2 , 3 instead, then the payoff of Player Max is equal to 1/56. Therefore, Player Max has a policy which guarantees him to win the game, i.e., to obtain a nonnegative payoff. The main theorem of this paper states that this fact is equivalent to the nontriviality of the spectrahedron {x ∈ K 3 0 : Q(x) 0}. In this way, a winning policy of Player Max (resp. Min) will be seen to provide a feasibility (resp. infeasibility) certificate. The mean payoff represents a feasibility/infeasibility margin.
TROPICAL SPECTRAHEDRA

Tropical Algebra
In this section, we briefly introduce the basic concepts of tropical algebra and its connection with the nonarchimedean field of Puiseux series. 1 We allow the case i = j. In other words, Player Min can
ii is negative. In this case, Nature selects i.
We denote by val : K → R ∪ {−∞} the map which associates a Puiseux series x ∈ K to its valuation. We use the convention val(0) = −∞. It is immediate to see that the map val satisfies the following properties
meaning that val is a nonarchimedean valuation. Moreover, the equality holds in (2) if the leading terms of x and y do not cancel, which is the case if val(x) = val(y) or if x, y 0. Loosely speaking, the tropical semifield T can be thought of as the image of K by the nonarchimedean valuation. The base set of T is defined to be R ∪ {−∞}. It is endowed with the addition x ⊕ y := max(x, y) and the multiplication x y := x + y. The term semifield refers to the fact that the addition does not have an opposite law. We use the notation n i=1 ai = a1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ an and a n = a . . . a (n times). We also endow T with the standard order . The map val yields an order-preserving morphism of semifields from K 0 to T. This follows from (3) and from the equality case in (2) . We refer the reader to [8, 17] for more information on the tropical semifield.
It is convenient to keep track not only of the valuation of a series but also of its sign. To this end, we introduce the signed valuation, denoted by sval, which associates to a series x ∈ K the couple (sign(x), val(x)), where sign(x) ∈ {0, ±1} denotes the sign of x, which is equal to +1 if x > 0, −1 if x < 0, and 0 otherwise. We denote by T± the image of K by sval. We call it the set of signed tropical numbers. For brevity, we denote an element of the form ( , a) by a if = 1, a if = −1, and −∞ if = 0. Here, is a formal symbol. We call the elements of the first and second kind the positive and negative tropical numbers, respectively. We denote by T+ and T− the corresponding sets. In this way, (−2) is tropically positive, but (−2) is tropically negative. Also, T is embedded in T±, i.e., T = T+ ∪ {−∞}.
In T±, we define a modulus function, |·| : T± → T, as |−∞| = −∞ and |a| = | a| = a for all a ∈ T+. We point out that straightforwardly extends to T± using the standard rules for the sign, for instance 2 ( 3) = 5. In contrast, we only partially extend the tropical addition ⊕ to elements of T± of identical sign, e.g., 2⊕3 = 3 and ( 2)⊕( 3) = 3.
We shall extend the valuation maps val and sval to vectors and matrices in a coordinate-wise manner.
Finally, we use the notion of tropical polynomials. A tropical (signed) polynomial over the variables X1, . . . , Xn is a formal expression of the form
where Λ ⊂ {0, 1, 2, . . . } n , and aα ∈ T± \{−∞} for all α ∈ Λ.
We say that the tropical polynomial P vanishes on the point
. . x αn n which have the greatest modulus do not have the same sign. If P does not vanish on x, we define P (x) as the tropical sum of the terms which have the greatest modulus. As an example, if P (X) = 2 X 3 1 X 4 2 ⊕ ( 0)X2, then P (1, 5) = 25, P (1, −5) = (−5), whereas P vanishes on (1, −5/3). These definitions are motivated by the following immediate lemma, which shows that the structure laws of T± are essentially the images of the ones of K.
and let P be defined as in (4) with aα := sval(aα). Then, for all x ∈ K n , sval(P (x)) = P (sval(x)) , provided that P does not vanish on sval(x).
Given a polynomial P as in Lemma 3.1, we denote by P + the polynomial formed by the terms aαX α 1 1 . . . X αn n such that aα > 0. Similarly, P − refers to the polynomial consisting of the terms −aαX α 1 1 . . . X αn n verifying aα < 0. In this way, P = P + − P − . We also use the analogues of these polynomials in the tropical setting. If P is the tropical polynomial given in (4), we define P + (resp. P − ) as the tropical polynomial generated by the terms |aα| X α 1 1 . . . X αn n where aα ∈ T+ (resp. T−). Observe that the quantities P + (x) and P − (x) are well defined for all x ∈ T n , since the tropical polynomials P + and P − only involve tropically positive coefficients.
Throughout the paper, we denote the set {1, . . . , k} by [k].
Tropicalization of Nonarchimedean Spectrahedra
We now introduce the notion of tropical spectrahedra.
Definition 3.2. A set S ⊂ T n is said to be a tropical spectrahedron if there exists a spectrahedron S ⊂ K n 0 such that S = val(S).
If S = val(S), then we refer to S as the tropicalization of the spectrahedron S, and S is said to be a lift (over the field K) of S. Our approach to the problem of checking the triviality of a spectrahedron S ⊂ K n 0 consists in determining whether or not the corresponding tropical spectrahedron S = val(S) is trivial, i.e., is reduced to the singleton {(−∞, . . . , −∞)}. To this purpose, it is convenient to exploit some explicit description of the set S. Recall that a symmetric matrix with entries in a real closed field is positive semidefinite if and only if every principal minor of the matrix is nonnegative. This property provides a description of S by a system of polynomial inequalities of the form det QI×I (x) 0, where I is a nonempty subset of [m], and det QI×I (x) corresponds to the (I × I)-minor of the matrix Q(x) = x1Q (1) + · · · + xnQ (n) . Following this, we obtain that the tropical spectrahedron S is included in the intersection of the images of the sets {x ∈ K n 0 : det QI×I (x) 0} under the valuation map. Unfortunately, this inclusion may be strict, see [3, Example 15] for an example in which S is a polyhedron. Section 3.2.1 deals with a class of tropical spectrahedra for which we overcome this difficulty, and obtain an explicit description. It turns out that this description only involves the tropical counterpart of the nonnegativity constraints on minors of order 1 and 2. In Section 3.2.2, we show that this kind of description is valid for the tropicalization of a large class of spectrahedra, for which the valuation of the coefficients of the matrices Q (k) satisfy a genericity condition. Section 3.2.2 also provides an illustration of these results on the spectrahedron introduced in Section 2.
Tropical Metzler Spectrahedra
Recall that a matrix A is called (negated) Metzler matrix if its off-diagonal coefficients are nonpositive. Similarly, we say that a matrix M ∈ T m×m ± is a tropical Metzler matrix if Mij ∈ T− ∪ {−∞} for all i = j. Let Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) ∈ T m×m ± be symmetric tropical Metzler matrices. Given i, j ∈ [m], we refer to Qij(X) as the tropical polynomial:
Xn .
We define the tropical Metzler spectrahedron associated with Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) as the set S of the points x ∈ T n that fulfill the following two conditions:
Observe that the term Qij(x) (i = j) is well defined for any x ∈ T n thanks to the Metzler property of the matrices Q (k) .
With standard notation, the constraints defining the set S respectively read:
and for all i, j ∈ [m] such that i < j,
The next theorem ensures that S is indeed a tropical spectrahedron. To this purpose, we explicitly construct a spectrahedron S ⊂ K n 0 verifying val(S) = S.
Theorem 3.3. The set S is a tropical spectrahedron.
We next sketch the proof of this theorem. We define the matrices Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) ∈ K m×m as follows:
ij ∈ T+ (which, under our assumptions, can happen only if i = j), then Q (k)
We consider the spectrahedron S := {x ∈ K n 0 : Q(x) 0}. It is easy to see that val(S) ⊂ S. To show the opposite inclusion, we introduce the following set
and show that S ⊂ val(S ). The following elementary lemma implies that S ⊂ S.
Lemma 3.4. Let A ∈ K m×m be a symmetric matrix. Suppose that A has nonnegative entries on its diagonal and that the inequality AiiAjj (m − 1) 2 A 2 ij holds for all pairs (i, j) such that i = j. Then A is positive semidefinite.
Tropicalization of Nonarchimedean Spectrahedra in the Generic Case
Theorem 3.3 and its proof exhibits a construction of a lift S = {x ∈ K n 0 : Q(x) 0}. This lift is obtained by taking matrices Q (k) such that sval(Q (k) ) = Q (k) . However, we have chosen the entries of these matrices in a careful way to ensure that val(S) = S. It is natural to ask if the latter relation still holds for other choices of the coefficients Q (k) ij . Said in a different way, we aim at identifying a larger class of spectrahedra S whose tropicalization is described by the constraints (5) and (6) defining S. The next theorem states that if the entries Q (k) ij of the tropical matrices satisfy a certain genericity condition, then the tropicalization of any spectrahedron S = {x ∈ K n 0 : Q(x) 0} satisfying sval(Q (k) ) = Q (k) is given by the set S. Our genericity condition has two components: first, we assume that each matrix Q (k) has nondegenerate tropical minors of order two. In other words, we suppose that Q
jj belong to T+. This ensures that the closure of the interior of S ∩ R n lies inside val(S ∩ K n >0 ). Therefore, the claim is true if we further assume that every stratum of S is regular, i.e., that for every nonempty set K ⊂ [n], the tropical Metzler spectrahedron associated with (Q (k) ) k∈K , denoted SK , fulfills the equality SK ∩ R |K| = cl(int(SK ∩ R |K| )). This is generically true and constitutes the second part of our condition.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that for every k the matrix Q (k) has nondegenerate tropical minors of order two. Moreover, suppose that every stratum of S is regular. Then val(S) = S for every spectrahedron S = {x ∈ K n 0 : Q(x) 0} such that sval(Q (k) ) = Q (k) . The first inequality comes from (5) with i = 2, and the last three constraints from (6) . 2 The intersection of S with the hyperplane x3 = 0 is depicted on Figure 2 . It can be checked that S fulfills the conditions of Theorem 3.5, so that the tropicalization of the spectrahedron of Section 2 is precisely described by the four inequalities given above.
TROPICAL SPECTRAHEDRA AND STO-CHASTIC GAMES
Stochastic Mean Payoff Games
In this section, we present the class of games which is related to nonarchimedean semidefinite feasibility problems. For simplicity, we refer to them as stochastic mean payoff games, although as we shall see, this terminology usually corresponds to a larger class of games. This abuse of language is justified by the fact that the associated decision problems are poly-time equivalent, as discussed below. 2 The constraints of the form (5) with i = 1, 3 are trivial. In our setting, a stochastic mean payoff game involves two players, Max and Min, which control disjoint sets of states. The states owned by Max and Min are respectively indexed by elements of [m] and [n]. We will use the symbols i, j to refer to states of Player Max, and k, l to states of Player Min. Both players alternatively move a pawn over these states as follows. When the pawn is on a state k ∈ [n], Player Min chooses an action a ∈ A (k) , which is defined as a subset of states of Max of cardinality 1 or 2: if a = {i}, then the pawn is moved to the state i, while if a = {i, j} with i = j, it is moved to the state i (resp. j) with probability 1/2. In both cases, Player Max receives from Player Min a reward denoted by r a k . Once the pawn is on a state i ∈ [m], Player Max picks an action b ∈ B (i) , where b is a subset of states of Min of cardinality 1. Then, Player Max moves the pawn to the state l such that b = {l}, and Player Min pays him a payment denoted by r b i . We suppose that Player Min starts the game and that players can always make the next move, i.e., that A (k) = ∅ and B (i) = ∅ for all i ∈ [m] and k ∈ [n].
A policy for Player Min is a function mapping every state k ∈ [n] to an action σ(k) in A (k) . Analogously, a policy for Player Max is a function τ such that τ (i) ∈ B (i) for all i ∈ [m]. Suppose that the game starts from a state k * of Player Min. When players play according to a couple (σ, τ ) of policies, the movement of the pawn is described by a Markov chain. The average payoff of Player Max in the long-term is then defined as:
where the expectation Eσ,τ is taken over all the trajectories k1, i1, k2, . . . , ip starting from k1 = k * in the Markov chain. 3 The goal of Player Max is to find a policy which maximizes his average payoff, while Player Min aims at minimizing this quantity. The basic theorem of stochastic mean payoff games is the existence of "optimal" policies for both players. This was first proven by Liggett and Lippman [16] .
Theorem 4.1. There exists a pair of policies (σ, τ ) and a unique vector χ ∈ R n such that for all initial states k ∈ [n], the following two conditions are satisfied:
• for each policy σ of Player Min, χ k g k (σ, τ );
• for each policy τ of Player Max, χ k g k (σ, τ ).
The vector χ in Theorem 4.1 is referred to as the value of the game. Note that for every k, the quantity χ k coincides with average payoff g k (σ, τ ) associated with the couple of policies (σ, τ ). The first condition in Theorem 4.1 states that, by playing according to the policy τ , Player Max is certain to get an average payoff greater than or equal to the value χ k associated with the initial state. Symmetrically, Player Min is ensured to limit her average loss to the quantity χ k by following the policy σ.
A state k ∈ [n] is said to be winning (for Player Max) if the value χ k of the game starting from the initial state k is nonnegative. We denote by Smpg the following decision problem: "given a stochastic mean payoff game, does there exist an initial state which is winning for Player Max?" It can be shown that if a policy of one player is fixed, then the remaining 1-player game can be solved in polynomial time by linear programming [11, Section 2.9 ]. This readily implies that Smpg is in NP ∩ coNP. However, as discussed in the introduction, the question whether there exists a poly-time algorithm to solve this problem is open.
Remark 4.2. In the literature, stochastic mean payoff games correspond to a larger class of problems [5] . These general games admit a value and optimal policies as well. It turns out that the associated decision problem is poly-time equivalent to the problem Smpg defined above. Moreover, these decision problems are poly-time equivalent to the problem of computing the value and a pair of optimal policies.
One of the possible approaches to analyze stochastic mean payoff games is to introduce the associated Shapley operator, which is a map F from R n to itself defined as:
where we use the convention that i = j when a ∈ A (i) is the singleton {i}. This map naturally extends to a self-map of T n , by setting 1 2 (−∞) = −∞. The vectors x such that x F (x) may be thought of as nonlinear analogues of subharmonic functions. The existence of such a nontrivial vector x was shown in [2] to be equivalent to the property that the mean payoff game has at least one winning state, in the case of deterministic games. The approach of [2] is based in particular on a nonlinear fixed point theorem (Collatz-Wielandt theorem). The same arguments lead to the following result in the case of stochastic games. 
Equivalence between Stochastic Games and Tropical Metzler Spectrahedra
We now describe the connection between tropical spectrahedra and stochastic mean payoff games. Let us consider a tropical Metzler spectrahedron S associated with the matrices Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) ∈ T m×m ± . We construct a stochastic mean payoff game Γ consisting of m states of Max and n states of Min. For each state k ∈ [n] of Player Min, the set A (k) consists of:
• the actions {i} with payment −|Q ii ∈ T+. Recall that in the games which we consider, every state has to be equipped with at least one action, i.e., the sets A (k) and B (i) must be nonempty. In consequence, our construction is valid provided that the following assumption on the matrices Q (k) is satisfied:
ii belongs to T+. Concerning the nontriviality of tropical spectrahedra, Assumption A can be made without loss of generality, up to extracting submatrices from Q (k) or eliminating some of them.
The relationship between the tropical spectrahedron S and the game Γ is given by the following lemma: 
By distinguishing whether i and j are equal in these inequalities, we recover the constraints given in (5) and (6) .
Then, from Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 4.4, we obtain:
Corollary 4.5. The tropical spectrahedron S is nontrivial if and only if the stochastic game Γ has at least one winning initial state.
Along the same lines, we can reciprocally associate a tropical spectrahedron with any stochastic game. In more details, starting from a stochastic game Γ specified as in Section 4.1, we construct symmetric Metzler matrices Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) ∈ T m×m ± from the actions of the players. We define Q We denote by Tmsdfp the tropical Metzler semidefinite feasibility problem: "given symmetric tropical Metzler matrices Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) ∈ T m×m ± satisfying Assumption A, is the associated tropical Metzler spectrahedron trivial?" As a consequence of Corollary 4.5, we obtain the equivalence between the two decision problems Smpg and Tmsdfp. This equivalence can be refined thanks to the fact that Smpg restricted to games with payments equal to 0 or ±1 is polytime equivalent to Smpg for arbitrary payments. This yields the following result:
Corollary 4.6. The problems Smpg and Tmsdfp are poly-time equivalent. Furthermore, if either of these problems can be solved in pseudopolynomial time, then both of them can be solved in polynomial time.
Algorithms for Tropical Metzler Semidefinite Feasibility Problem
In this section, we discuss algorithms that can solve Tmsdfp thanks to the equivalence with Smpg established in Corollary 4.6. Let L denote the maximal number of bits needed to encode an entry from matrices Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) . An exponential bound for Tmsdfp is achieved by a naive algorithm that enumerates all policies of one player and uses linear programming to solve the remaining 1-player game. The best currently known bound for Tmsdfp can be derived from the randomized subexponential algorithm of Halman [14] . The distinctive feature of this algorithm is that it works in strongly subexponential time, i.e., its arithmetic complexity does not depend on L. We next illustrate our approach by benchmarks. We rely here on an algorithm with poorer theoretical bounds, but which is well adapted practically to some large scale instances: value iteration. This algorithm may be thought of as a nonlinear analogue of the power algorithm to compute the dominant eigenvalue of a matrix. Its advantage lies in scalability. This leads to a procedure called CheckFeasibility, provided in Figure 3 and which checks the triviality of a tropical spectrahedron. We next establish the validity of this algorithm in a special situation. Proposition 4.9. Assume that Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) have finite entries. Then, the mean payoff of the associated game Γ is independent of the initial state. Suppose in addition that this mean payoff differs from 0. Then, for all choices of ε > 0, the procedure CheckFeasibility terminates and is correct.
Note that the situation in which the mean payoff is zero is degenerate: then, an infinitesimal perturbation of the entries can make the spectrahedron trivial or nontrivial. Value iteration cannot naturally handle such degenerate situations, which can be solved by different methods like the policy iteration algorithm of [1] (with an implementation in exact arithmetics). Every iteration (while loop) of the procedure CheckFeasibility takes a time O(nm 2 ), which is linear in the size of the input. The number of iterations can only be bounded by an exponential in the size of the input. However, 1: procedure CheckFeasibility(Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) , ε) 2: Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) ∈ T m×m ± , Metzler matrices satisfying Assumption A, ε > 0 a numerical precision.
3:
u := 0 ∈ R n , v := 0 ∈ R n 4:
while max k u k > −ε and min k u k < ε do
5:
v := max(v, u), u := F (u)
F is the Shapley operator of the game Γ associated to Q (1) , . . . , Q (n) . The operation max on vectors is understood entrywise.
6:
done 7:
if max k u k −ε then
8:
The tropical spectrahedron is trivial.
9:
else 10:
The vector v belongs to the tropical spectrahedron. our benchmarks indicate that the algorithm is fast when the instance is "far from being degenerate". which lies in the interior of the tropical spectrahedron shown in Figure 2 . The rounded vector (1.06, 0.02, 1.13) is also in the interior, and x := (t 1.06 , t 0.02 , t 1.13 ) fulfills Q(x) 0.
11:
We report in Table 1 experimental results for different values of (n, m). We chose all the |Q (k) ij |, for i j, to be independent random variables uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Moreover, the diagonal coefficients Q (k)
ii were chosen to have a positive tropical sign. We took ε = 10 −8 (the performance was similar for ε = 10 −6 or ε = 10 −10 ). Our experiments were obtained using a C program, distributed as an ancillary file attached to the arXiv preprint [4] for reproducibility purposes. This program was compiled under Linux with gcc -O3, and executed on a single core of an Intel(R) i7-4600U CPU at 2.10GHz with 16GB RAM. We report the average execution time over 10 samples for every value of (n, m). The number of iterations did not exceed 731 on this benchmark, and, for most (n, m), it was limited to a few units. Indeed, random instances exhibit experimentally a phase transition: for a given (n, m), the system is either feasible with overwhelming probability, or infeasible with overwhelming probability, unless (n, m) lies in a tiny region of the parameter space. Value iteration quickly decides feasibility, except in regions close to the phase transition. As a result, the execution time does not increase monotonically with (n, m).
Remark 4.11. By Theorem 3.5, the procedure Check-Feasibility allows us to verify the feasibility of a Metzler nonarchimedean spectrahedron if the genericity condition of this theorem is satisfied. However, even when this genericity condition is not satisfied, the same procedure can be shown to check correctly the feasibility of the nonarchimedean problem assuming that the value of the mean payoff game Γ differs from zero.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have shown that under a genericity condition on the valuations, solving feasibility semidefinite problems over the field of Puiseux series, in which the input matrices have a Metzler sign pattern, reduces to a well studied class of zero-sum stochastic games. This leads both to complexity bounds and to algorithms capable experimentally to solve large scale nonarchimedean instances. The interest is also to relate two different problems with unsettled complexities. This is the first exposition of this approach. Let us now point some limitations of our current results, together with possible developments of this work.
First, the present approach can be extended to handle non-Metzler sign patterns. However, the description of tropical spectrahedra is more involved in this case.
Moreover, it would be interesting to provide a characterization of all (not necessarily generic) tropical spectrahedra. Such a characterization is known for tropical polyhedra, and is given by the tropical Minkowski-Weyl theorem (see [10, Prop. 2.1] and [13, Th. 2] ). Unfortunately, the proof relies on the classical Minkowski-Weyl theorem, which has no known analogue for spectrahedra. Currently, we are unable to give a full characterization of tropical spectrahedra.
Finally, an interesting question is to use the present approach to deal with the real case, i.e., to see t as a deformation parameter and use the fact that the semidefinite feasibility problem is easily solvable for a large parameter t, to infer the solvability for smaller values of t. However, we expect exponential bounds on the bit size of t to guarantee that the deformed feasibility problem and the nonarchimedean feasibility problem have the same answer.
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